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Article 
Lessons Learned: Political Advertising 
and Political Law 
Kenneth Goldstein,† David A. Schweidel,†† and 
Mike Wittenwyler††† 
  INTRODUCTION   
For pundits and politicians, the thirty-second television 
spot has become the bogeyman of American elections—blamed 
for almost every ill in our political environment, everything 
from the cost of running for office, to the influence of lobbyists, 
to the inability of legislators to solve long-term policy problems, 
to voter apathy.1 
 
†  Kenneth Goldstein is President of Kantar Media's Campaign Media 
Analysis Group (CMAG). One of the nation’s foremost authorities on political 
advertising, Goldstein was a political science professor at the University of 
Wisconsin-Madison and the founding director of the University of Wisconsin’s 
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out, and presidential elections and news coverage. In addition to his oversight 
of CMAG, he continues to serve as a consultant for the ABC News Elections 
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NBC Nightly News, CNN, FOX, MSNBC, and CNBC, as well as in The New 
York Times, The Wall Street Journal, and The Washington Post. 
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The fact that television advertisements garner this signifi-
cant amount of attention is not necessarily surprising or un-
warranted. Television advertisements are the most visible form 
of paid political communications and are also the topic of more 
than their fair share of media stories.2 Thirty-second spots are 
also, by far, the single largest source of campaign expenditures, 
comprising between 40 and 50 percent of a campaign’s budget.3 
In fact, over the last few years, expenditures on political adver-
tising have reached record-breaking highs, with $2.2 billion 
spent in 2006, $2.1 billion spent in 2008, and $2.4 billion spent 
in 2010.4 To put these numbers into some more context, in 
2010, direct mail garnered $1 billion in spending, radio a little 
over $250 million, and the Internet just under $200 million.5 
Put another way, in the age of new media, traditional forms of 
advertising—television, radio, and snail mail—attracted 18 
times more spending than the Internet. In short, “[a] cam-
paign’s ads reveal the success of its fundraising, or lack thereof; 
float the messages it believes will win with voters; and shows 
who and where those voters are.”6 
Much of the attention to television advertising comes from 
critics of the way elections are financed, and television adver-
tising is often at the heart of legal and regulatory disputes over 
what is permitted in political speech. Political advertising was 
the most prominent issue in three of the most important cam-
paign finance cases of the last forty years: Buckley v. Valeo,7 
McConnell v. FEC,8 and Citizens United v. FEC.9 And political 
 
 1. MICHAEL M. FRANZ ET AL., CAMPAIGN ADVERTISING AND AMERICAN 
DEMOCRACY 2–5 (2007). 
 2. See id. at 1. 
 3. We rely upon data collected by Kantar Media CMAG, a commercial 
firm that tracks political advertising. These data are at the level of the indi-
vidual ad airing and allow us to know which sponsor, at what time, in which 
media market, on which television station, and during which program, each 
spot aired. These data are available to scholars through the University of Wis-
consin Advertising Project. U. WIS. ADVERTISING PROJECT, http://wiscadproject 
.wisc.edu ( last visited Apr. 25, 2012). Full methodological details on coding of 
the data are also available on the Wisconsin Advertising Project web site. Id. 
 4. Kim Geiger, Television Advertising in 2012 Election Could Top $3 Bil-
lion, L.A. TIMES POLITICS NOW (Oct. 6, 2011, 2:05 PM), http://www.latimes 
.com/news/politics/la-pn-2012-ads-could-top-3-billion-20111006,0,3667624.story. 
 5. See U. WIS. ADVERTISING PROJECT, supra note 3. 
 6. Ken Goldstein & Elizabeth Wilner, The Strategy Behind Political Ads, 
POLITICO (Jan. 13, 2012, 4:34 AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0112/ 
71390.html. 
 7. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
 8. 540 U.S. 93 (2003). 
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advertising was at the heart of the Bipartisan Campaign Re-
form Act of 2002 (known as BCRA or McCain-Feingold).10  
These cases not only established new legal standards, they 
generated heated debates among politicians, journalists, attor-
neys, legal scholars, and advocacy groups on the limits of free 
speech in competitive elections and the democratic process.  
The Citizens United decision in 2010 represented a signifi-
cant change to the federal campaign finance law and the regu-
lation of political advertising and political speech.11 As such, 
the decision has become a lightning rod for criticism by those 
who believe it hurt democracy and will lead to the demise of 
competitive elections. Critics say it weakens political candi-
dates and parties, hands more power to unaccountable and in-
dependent groups, cloaks more political fundraising in a veil of 
secrecy, and ultimately favors moneyed interests over the aver-
age  
voter.12 
Our aim in this Article is to explore these claims and to see 
if they hold up against the evidence in recent elections. Using a 
comprehensive database on the content and targeting of all po-
litical advertising aired in federal and state races in the 2002, 
2006, and 2010 midterm elections, we examine the nature of 
political advertising and look at how the ad wars were fought in 
the 2002 election (before implementation of BCRA), in the 2006 
election (after implementation of BCRA and the McConnell deci-
sion), and the 2010 election (after the Citizens United decision).13 
Tad Devine, a senior strategist to Senator John Kerry’s 
2004 presidential campaign, once commented that, “advertising 
is reality.”14 That is to say, advertising decisions reveal truths 
about fundraising, targeting, and messaging. Candidates may 
 
 9. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 10. Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431–
455, 18 U.S.C. § 607, 36 U.S.C. §§ 510–11, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2006)). 
 11. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 888 (stating that the decision would 
overturn portions of McConnell). 
 12. Elizabeth Kennedy, Citizens United Turns Two: Democracy Is Not a 
Game, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 19, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ 
elizabeth-kennedy/citizens-united-turns-two_b_1216013.html; Jesse Lee, Pres-
ident Obama on Citizens United: “Imagine the Power This Will Give Special In-
terests Over Politicians,” WHITE HOUSE BLOG (July 26, 2010, 3:07 PM), http:// 
www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/07/26/president-obama-citizens-united-imagine 
-power-will-give-special-interests-over-polit. 
 13. See U. WIS. ADVERTISING PROJECT, supra note 3. 
 14. Interview with Tad Devine, Senior Strategist, John Kerry 2004 Presi-
dential Campaign (Mar. 8, 2012). 
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say they want to avoid political advertising, address the issues 
on their merits, and engage in long-form debate, but political 
advertising is their primary means of communicating with vot-
ers. If they are not up on the air, voters are just not going to 
know about them. This is why, despite the vocal criticism of po-
litical advertising by journalists, campaign finance reformists, 
and even ordinary voters,15 political advertising persists as the 
primary means of political speech. 
Because the lion’s share of political money goes to spot po-
litical advertising, understanding its use can tell us much 
about the state of American political speech. We examine here 
how the composition, targeting, and tone of political advertising 
has changed over the last three midterm contests and discover 
what the data mean for political competition and political  
parties.  
In Part I, we describe the critical legal and practical differ-
ences between the key campaign finance laws, regulations, and 
cases, including BCRA,16 McConnell,17 FEC v. Wisconsin Right 
to Life,18 and Citizens United.19 
Part II addresses how regulation has affected political par-
ties. We look particularly at whether there are more group-
sponsored advertisements and fewer party-sponsored adver-
tisements. This analysis supports the view that political parties 
are declining in influence. 
In Part III, we examine how the volume and timing of po-
litical advertising has changed in response to the new regula-
tions. This analysis contradicts the view that the latest changes 
in election law have weakened political speech. 
Part IV analyzes the placement and targeting of advertis-
ing and how television advertising is reaching an increasingly 
wide swath of viewers. This analysis contradicts the view that 
political speech is becoming less diverse. 
Part V looks at the party affiliation of existing and new ad-
vertisers and explores whether the new laws on political adver-
tising favor one party over another. In addition, we look for 
signs of undue influence by single groups in the new environ-
 
 15. See Kennedy, supra note 12; Lee, supra note 12. 
 16. Pub. L. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.  
§§ 431–455, 18 U.S.C. § 607, 36 U.S.C. §§ 510–511, 47 U.S.C. § 315 (2006)). 
 17. 540 U.S. 93 (2003), overruled by Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 
876 (2010). 
 18. 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
 19. Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 876. 
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ment. The evidence so far suggests that the new election-
funding environment gives no unique advantage to any given 
party, but certainly advantages outside groups at the expense 
of the parties.  
Finally, in Part VI, we address how the new regulations af-
fect the diversity of political speech. We look at whether the 
new rules have led to more monochromatic political speech or 
not. 
I.  POLITICAL SPEECH AS A WATER BALLOON   
While the regulations affecting political speech may 
change, one thing remains the same: there will always be mon-
ey in the political system. It can be said that money acts much 
like water in an unbreakable balloon—no matter how much you 
squeeze it into one section of the balloon to confine it, water 
finds its way to another section. Despite multiple efforts to re-
duce or limit the amount of money in politics—whether through 
new laws, regulations, or lawsuits—money remains in the sys-
tem and continues to influence the political process. Regardless 
of the “reform,” it does not leave. 
A. EXPRESS ADVOCACY AND ISSUE ADVOCACY 
In Buckley v. Valeo, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the 
government can regulate only those political communications 
that expressly advocate a candidate’s election or defeat.20 That 
is, under Buckley, the First Amendment precludes any regula-
tion of political speech that does not “in express terms advocate 
the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.”21 In sub-
jecting only “express advocacy” to regulation, the Buckley Court 
concluded, in effect, that many forms of political communica-
tion would remain wholly unregulated.22  
Communication that does not expressly advocate the elec-
tion or defeat of a clearly identified candidate—generally called 
issue advocacy—had not, prior to enactment of BCRA and the 
holding in McConnell, been subject to any federal campaign fi-
nance regulation.23 By definition, issue-advocacy communica-
tions avoid any explicit discussion of an identified candidate’s 
 
 20. 424 U.S. 1, 79–80 (1976). 
 21. Id. at 45. 
 22. In restricting the extent of regulation to express advocacy, the Court 
noted that “[f ]unds spent to propagate one’s views on issues without expressly 
calling for a candidate’s election or defeat are thus not covered.” Id. at 44. 
 23. McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 126–28 (2003). 
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election or defeat and, instead, provide information on an issue 
or policy question associated with a public official or candi-
date—often, though not always, as part of a grassroots lobbying 
effort and, sometimes, in the period immediately before an  
election.24 
Many organizations long have engaged in some form of is-
sue advocacy about issues that affect them and about the posi-
tions that candidates take on issues. While, by definition, these 
issue-advocacy messages avoid any explicit mention of a candi-
date’s election or defeat, many of these communications draw 
attention to a policy question associated with a public official 
and refer directly to a public official—who may or may not be a 
candidate—by name. The format and content of an issue advo-
cacy communication are virtually limitless. 
In McConnell, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld BCRA’s fed-
eral “electioneering communication” standard against a facial 
challenge.25 The challenged standard empowered Congress to 
regulate certain types of broadcast issue advocacy aimed at 
federal elections occurring within a specified number of days of 
an election.26 BCRA’s federal electioneering communication 
standard did not, however, replace the express advocacy/issue 
advocacy distinction; rather, it refined that distinction—but on-
ly for federal candidates, only for specified time periods, and 
only for broadcast advertising.27 That is, neither the McConnell 
decision nor the new federal electioneering communication law 
changed this fundamental distinction between express advoca-
cy and issue advocacy. That distinction remains integral to 
state and federal law. 
In Wisconsin Right to Life—which involved an as-applied 
challenge to the same BCRA provisions facially challenged in 
McConnell—the Court further narrowed the range of permissi-
ble federal regulation of broadcast advocacy.28 The Court 
 
 24. See id. at 128. 
 25. 540 U.S. at 194. 
 26. BCRA expanded the scope of regulated communication to certain 
forms of broadcast (but not print, telephonic, websites, or e-mail) issue advoca-
cy within thirty days of a federal primary election or sixty days of a federal 
general election. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 434(f )(3), 441b (2006). Moreover, the registra-
tion and reporting threshold under BCRA for electioneering communications 
is $10,000. See id. § 434(f )(1).  
 27. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 132–34. 
 28. FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449 (2007). 
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adopted a narrow definition of “express advocacy”29 and held 
that the FEC could not constitutionally prohibit the use of cor-
porate funds to finance issue advocacy advertisements during 
pre-federal-election periods.30 After Wisconsin Right to Life, 
then, the range of broadcast advocacy subject to federal regula-
tion was limited to express advocacy and any communication 
that fit the Court’s extremely narrow conception of “the func-
tional equivalent of express advocacy.”31 
B. CITIZENS UNITED V. FEC 
In Citizens United, the U.S. Supreme Court held that pro-
hibitions on corporate sponsorship of independent expenditures 
are unconstitutional.32 The Court made clear that any attempt 
to restrict or limit political speech by any speaker—individuals, 
corporations, labor organizations, or tribes—would be highly 
disfavored.33 Accordingly, post-Citizens United, federal and 
state laws can no longer prohibit organizations from sponsoring 
or funding independent expenditures. 
The Court’s decision in Citizens United builds on the First 
Amendment principles set forth in Wisconsin Right to Life and 
reaffirms the government’s inability to restrict or limit spend-
ing on issue advocacy at any time, including the time period be-
fore an election.34 Just like a campaign finance regulation on 
independent expenditures, any electioneering communication 
or issue-advocacy regulation must be carefully crafted in a 
manner that permits speech regardless of the identity of the 
speaker.35 
 
 29. Id. at 469–70 (including only communications “susceptible of no rea-
sonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific 
candidate”). 
 30. Id. at 465. 
 31. Id. at 482, 457. 
 32. 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010). Independent expenditures are express ad-
vocacy communications sponsored by a third-party organization such as a po-
litical action committee (PAC). As independent communications, they cannot 
be coordinated in any way with a candidate or a candidate’s agent. 2 U.S.C. 
§ 431 (2006). Under federal campaign finance law and the laws in about half 
the states, corporations were prohibited, prior to Citizens United, from spon-
soring independent expenditure communications, and are still prohibited from 
making campaign contributions. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, STATE 
LAWS AFFECTED BY CITIZENS UNITED (2010), available at http://www.ncsl.org/ 
legislatures-elections/elections-campaigns/citizens-united-and-the-states.aspx# 
laws ( last updated Jan. 4, 2011). 
 33. See 130 S. Ct. at 881–85. 
 34. See Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 481–82. 
 35. See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 913. 
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While Citizens United makes it very difficult for govern-
ment to prohibit or at all limit the content or source of political 
speech, the Court was equally clear that disclaimer and disclo-
sure requirements are permissible.36 The right to speak about 
candidates, public officials, and public policy is virtually beyond 
regulation, but the public has the right to evaluate that speech 
based, in part, on the disclosure of its source.37 However, any 
disclosure requirements first must be imposed—if at all—by 
state or federal law.38 
Citizens United only addressed corporate spending on in-
dependent expenditures and not corporate contributions to 
candidates and other political committees. In those jurisdic-
tions where direct corporate campaign contributions are prohib-
ited, they will remain prohibited. Citizens United does nothing 
to upset those bans and, instead, suggests that such prohibi-
tions will continue to be upheld.39 
In the two years since the Supreme Court’s holding in Citi-
zens United, independent political speakers continue to gain 
greater freedoms,40 provided that the speech is independent, 
but not coordinated.41 Moreover, contribution restrictions have 
continued to be upheld, further enhancing the role of independ-
ent speakers and spending on their communications.42 While 
the U.S. Supreme Court will likely have more opportunities to 
revisit these issues,43 independent political speech continues for 
now to be the area of political spending toward which money is 
being pushed. 
 
 36. See id. at 914. 
 37. See id. at 914–16. 
 38. See id. 
 39. See id. at 901–02, 908 (“[The Court has] sustained limits on direct con-
tributions in order to ensure against the reality or appearance of corruption.”). 
 40. See, e.g., SpeechNow.org v. FEC, 599 F.3d 686, 696 (D.C. Cir. 2010) 
(striking down federal contribution limits as applied to organizations only en-
gaged in independent political speech). 
 41. See, e.g., Cao v. FEC, 619 F.3d 410, 430–31 (5th Cir. 2010) (upholding 
federal contribution limits and coordination restrictions). 
 42. See, e.g., Bluman v. FEC, 800 F. Supp. 2d 281, 288–90 (D.D.C. 2011) 
(upholding prohibition on contributions by foreign nationals), aff ’d mem., 132 
S. Ct. 1087 (2012). 
 43. See, e.g., Wagner v. FEC, No. 11-1841 (JEB), 2012 WL 1255145 
(D.D.C. Apr. 16, 2012) (challenging prohibition on federal contractor contribu-
tions); United States v. Danielczyk 791 F. Supp. 2d 513, 518 (E.D. Va. 2011) 
(motion for reconsideration denied) (striking down federal prohibition on cor-
porate campaign contributions); W. Tradition P’ship v. Attorney General, No. 
DA 11-0081, 2011 WL 6888567, at *15 (Mont. Dec. 30, 2011) (upholding Mon-
tana’s right to prohibit corporate spending on independent expenditures). 
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II.  POLITICAL PARTIES AS A DIMINISHING FORCE   
The total amount spent on advertising for state and federal 
elections was $2.2 billion in 2006, $2.1 billion in 2008, and $2.4 
billion in 2010.44 This includes advertisements on national, ca-
ble, broadcast, and spot television. It does not include local spot 
cable, which accounts for a growing amount of expenditures, 
but is still a smaller proportion of overall political advertising 
spending—about 15 percent.45 
As Figure 1 illustrates, overall spending in federal races in 
the 2002, 2006, and 2010 mid-term elections reveals that the 
proportion candidates comprise of political advertising has gone 
down slightly, from 60% of total campaign advertising spending 
in 2002, to 50% in 2006, to about 45% in 2010.46 The proportion 
of ad dollars spent by parties in elections has decreased signifi-
cantly, from about 35% in 2002, to 25% in 2006, to 15% in 
2010.47 By contrast, the proportion of ad dollars spent by out-
side groups has gone up significantly, from about 10% in 2002, 
to 25% in 2006, to 50% in 2010.48 
 
Figure 1 
Share of Advertising Spending for 2002, 2006, and 2010  
Congressional Elections49 
 
 44. See Geiger, supra note 4. 
 45. See id. 
 46. See infra Figure 1. 
 47. See id. 
 48. See id. 
 49. U. WIS. ADVERTISING PROJECT, supra note 3. 
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Notably, these three midterm elections spanned a period of 
significant change in campaign finance law. In 2002, Congress 
had passed BCRA, but had not yet implemented it.50 The 2006 
elections, by contrast, were subject to BCRA rules.51 And the 
2010 elections were governed by the rules laid out in Citizens 
United.52 
The data in Figure 1 can best be explained by those chang-
es in the law. The political parties lost spending strength dur-
ing this period because BCRA negatively affected their ability 
to raise money.53 The decision in Citizens United, by compari-
son, strengthened the ability of outside groups to raise and 
spend more money.54 
This would appear to confirm the criticism that recent 
changes in election law have weakened political parties and 
strengthened outside groups. It should be noted, however, that 
the trend of weakening political parties began before Citizens 
United, and party losses in spending power may well have more 
to do with the declining confidence major political funders have 
in political parties as a means of winning elections.55 It is also 
not entirely clear that weakening political parties also results 
in diminished political involvement and diversity. In fact, the 
ruling has appeared to increase that diversity by making it 
harder for political parties to dominate particular forums and 
by making it comparatively easier for entities other than tradi-
tional political parties to finance advertisements. One of the 
core features of the post-Citizens United world is decentralized 
 
 50. See Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 
§ 402, 116 Stat. 91, 112–13 (making Nov. 6, 2002 BCRA’s earliest effective 
date, one day after the U.S. general elections). 
 51. See id. 
 52. See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 876, 917 (2010) (declaring 
unconstitutional certain prohibitions on corporate and union political expendi-
tures, on Jan. 21, 2010, before the 2010 U.S. elections). 
 53. MICHAEL J. MALBIN, THE ELECTION AFTER REFORM: MONEY, POLI-
TICS, AND THE BIPARTISAN CAMPAIGN REFORM ACT 60–67 (2006). 
 54. See R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41054, CAMPAIGN FI-
NANCE AFTER CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION: ISSUES 
AND OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS 2 (2010), available at http://fpc.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/137016.pdf (noting that, after Citizens United, corpo-
rations “can fund unlimited express advocacy issue messages” and “appear to be 
free to fund electioneering communications from their treasuries at any time”). 
 55. See The Party’s (Largely) Over, ECONOMIST, Oct. 23, 2010, at 71, 71–
72, available at http://www.economist.com/node/17306082 (suggesting that the 
decline of a strong party base diminishes political parties’ power to push 
through legislation—especially controversial reforms—and award donors  
influence). 
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management of political speech. This would rebut the criticism 
that the Citizens United ruling has reduced the diversity of 
voices in the political marketplace. In fact, the ruling has ap-
peared to increase that diversity. 
III.  THE TIMING OF ADVERTISING   
Both BCRA and Citizens United influenced the timing of 
advertisement placement, as well as the proportion of expendi-
tures spent on advertising. 
Generally, there is always more money spent on advertis-
ing at the end of a campaign than at the beginning.56 This is 
because most political professionals believe that advertising at 
the end of a campaign has a greater effect on voting patterns 
than advertising at the beginning of a campaign.57 But with so 
much more money spent on advertising by campaigns, parties, 
and groups, there is simply not enough television time or in-
ventory to go around over the last two weeks of a campaign. 
That means everyone buying television time has to spread out 
the advertisements over the course of a campaign. Consider 
Figure 2. In 2002, the proportion of advertising expenditures on 
television advertising was about 20% during the last week of a 
campaign.58 In 2006, the proportion was a little more than 15% 
in the last week of a campaign, and by 2010, this proportion 
was just over 10%.59  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 56. See JUDITH S. TRENT ET AL., POLITICAL CAMPAIGN COMMUNICATION: 
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 352–53 (7th ed. 2011) (explaining that most cam-
paigns begin buying ad time near Election Day and work their way backward 
as funds allow, believing that voter exposure will have the greatest impact just 
before the election). 
 57. See id. 
 58. See infra Figure 2. 
 59. See id. 
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Figure 2 
Proportion of Total Advertising Expenditures Over Time60 
 
Despite these common challenges, those who buy television 
time exhibit differences in strategies. 
As Figure 3 illustrates, candidate spending mirrored the 
overall trend of less concentrated spending in the final weeks of 
a campaign.61 In 2002, candidates spent about 20% of their ad-
vertising budget on television advertising in the last week of 
the campaign.62 In 2006, candidates spent about 18%, and by 
2010, that proportion was down to about 15%.63  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 60. U. WIS. ADVERTISING PROJECT, supra note 3. 
 61. See infra Figure 3. 
 62. See id. 
 63. See id. 
 1744 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [96:1732 
 
Figure 3 
Proportion of Candidate Advertising Over Time64 
 
This decline in candidate expenditures immediately prior 
to elections differs from the traditional model. Traditionally, 
candidates plan their advertising budget beginning with elec-
tion day and moving backwards.65 Generally, they create an 
advertising budget and allocate a certain amount of money over 
the course of the campaign, based on how many advertisements 
they want to air at the end of the campaign.66 This strategy al-
lows for an additional concentration of advertisements at the 
end of the elections. 
Parties are beginning to follow this model of back-
budgeting as well. But in contrast to candidate spending, the 
proportion of spending by parties on television advertising has 
increased since both BCRA and Citizens United. In 2002, par-
ties spent about 20% of their advertising expenditures on tele-
vision ads in the last week of the campaign.67 In 2006, this pro-
portion was up to 25%, and by 2010, it was almost 30% of their 
advertising expenditures.68 
 
 
 
 
 64. U. WIS. ADVERTISING PROJECT, supra note 3. 
 65. See TRENT ET AL., supra note 56. 
 66. See id. 
 67. See infra Figure 4. 
 68. See id. 
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Figure 4 
Proportion of Party Advertising Over Time69 
 
Figure 5 shows that interest groups, buoyed by Citizens 
United, have followed a different approach. Overall, the propor-
tion of interest group advertising in the very last weeks of a 
campaign has actually become less concentrated. In 2002, in-
terest groups spent about 17% of their advertising budget on 
television advertisements at the end of a campaign.70 After 
BCRA, in 2006, that proportion dropped to about 4%.71 It 
picked back up a little bit in 2010, when the proportion of 
spending was about 5%.72 In addition, in the last few weeks of 
the 2006 and 2008 campaigns, interest group spending was rel-
atively flat, as there was a much more consistent focus.73 By 
contrast, in 2002, advertising did not really pick up at all until 
the last two or three weeks of a campaign.74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 69. U. WIS. ADVERTISING PROJECT, supra note 3. 
 70. See infra Figure 5. 
 71. See id. 
 72. See id. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. 
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Figure 5 
Proportion of Interest Group Advertising Over Time75 
 
These trends largely stem from interest-group political 
strategy. Early on in a campaign, interest groups may try to get 
their messages across to as broad an audience as possible. For 
example, in the 2010 campaign, groups began researching races 
early to determine which ones would be competitive and where 
advertising dollars could be most effective in swinging a district 
to a favored candidate.76 Later in the race, the groups analyzed 
the effect of that early money, and recommitted to higher 
amounts in races which had proven to be competitive, while 
abandoning those races which had not.77  
 
 75. U. WIS. ADVERTISING PROJECT, supra note 3. 
 76. See, e.g., Michael Luo & Griff Palmer, Outside Groups on the Right 
Flexed Muscles in House Races, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, at P6 (“In many cas-
es, the Republican-oriented groups got involved in the races early on, batter-
ing Democratic candidates with negative advertisements, helping to set the 
tone in those districts, even if Democratic candidates and their allies were 
eventually able to outspend them.”). 
 77. See, e.g., Mark Hosenball, Pro-Republican Groups Spend Big on Key 
Races, REUTERS, Oct. 27, 2010, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2010/10/27/us-usa-elections-finance-idUSTRE69Q5RV20101027 (reporting 
that 2010 Republican senatorial candidate Christine O’Donnell received only 
$300,000 from outside, pro-Tea Party groups in the waning weeks of the cam-
paign while her opponent received “no additional support from independent 
pro-Democratic groups—a reflection of the assessment that O’Donnell’s con-
sistently poor polling numbers suggest she will probably lose on [Election 
Day]”). 
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Different interest groups can also share this type of infor-
mation among themselves. They can then divide up the labor 
and decide which group should advertise in which race.78 Such 
collaboration would be illegal if the interest groups were coor-
dinating along with the candidates.79 These groups are, howev-
er, still allowed to work among themselves.  
These data suggest that while Citizens United has 
strengthened independent groups, they have deployed this 
strength in a way that could actually prove to make elections 
more competitive and democracy more vibrant. By devoting 
early advertising dollars to relatively unproven candidates, the 
outside groups can identify political contests which are surpris-
ingly competitive, and even provide a leg-up to candidates who 
would otherwise struggle to gain a voice. This is true both in 
the general election and the primary election, where insurgent 
candidates are often opposed by political parties.80 So while this 
confirms the criticism that Citizens United has strengthened 
independent groups at the expense of political parties, it would 
appear that this exchange of power has strengthened the politi-
cal process, based on the access of candidates to early advertis-
ing dollars, a critical seedcorn. 
IV.  ADVERTISEMENT PLACEMENT AND TARGETING   
Another trend in television political advertising is that the 
ads themselves are much less concentrated among programs 
and reach a much broader viewership. Before BCRA and Citi-
zens United, more than 50% of advertising dollars bought time 
 
 78. See, e.g., Jim Rutenberg, Pro-Republican Groups Prepare Big Push at 
End of Races, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2010, at A1 (describing how many con-
servative interest groups worked together in the 2010 campaign by “trading 
information through weekly strategy sessions and regular conference 
calls . . . [and] divid[ing] up races to avoid duplication . . . and to ensure that 
their money is spread around to put Democrats on the defensive in as many 
districts and states as possible”). 
 79. Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 910 (2010) (overturning the 
BCRA’s ban on independent expenditures, but noting that “[b]y definition, an 
independent expenditure is political speech presented to the electorate that is 
not coordinated with a candidate” (emphasis added)). 
 80. See SUSAN J. CARROLL, WOMEN AS CANDIDATES IN AMERICAN POLI-
TICS 25 (2d ed. 1994) (“Because victories on the part of insurgent candidates 
may further weaken party leaders’ control over future nominations, party 
leaders would prefer to avoid such occurrences.”). 
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during only the top twenty television programs.81 Now, the top 
twenty programs receive only about 25% of the ad buy.82 
This trend is the result of two factors. First, ad buyers are 
more strategic about how they purchase ads, focusing on pro-
grams where they are likely to reach their intended audiences. 
Second, with the increase in television advertising, campaigns 
and groups can afford to spend on a broader array of programs.  
Neither of these explanations supports the criticisms of 
Citizens United. The more targeted approach employed by both 
major parties reflects a more efficient approach to their adver-
tising budget. Political advertising used to use a carpet-
bombing approach, with a goal of covering as wide an area as 
possible with political messaging.83 Campaigns and buyers are 
now shifting to a rifle-shot approach, focused on reaching tar-
geted audiences with specific messages.  
The 2004 Bush campaign recognized the value of this ap-
proach when research showed Republican-leaning voters were 
not watching television shows in the same ratio that all voters 
were.84 Republicans decided to spend more on programs 
watched by Republicans, aiming to generate enthusiasm for 
their candidate and to avoid pouring money into programs that 
were viewed largely by Democratic voters.85  
This approach, which was employed by the Obama cam-
paign in 2008,86 can spread political speech across a broader 
spectrum of the population by reaching niche audiences. Rather 
than concentrating political advertising dollars within a few 
major networks, the new micro-targeting strategies make more 
media relevant to the political process.  
There are two countervailing trends here. On the one hand, 
the increased micro-targeting of political speech makes it likely 
that political speech will only reach certain well-defined and 
narrow audiences. This increased targeting, done by both the 
Bush campaign in 2004 and the Obama campaign in 2008, 
 
 81. See U. WIS. ADVERTISING PROJECT, supra note 3. 
 82. See id. 
 83. See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, How to Sell a Candidate to a Porsche-
Driving, Leno-Loving Nascar Fan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2004, at A18 
(“[P]residential campaigns have generally relied on the reach of broadcast tel-
evision to try to influence the widest possible audience.”). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See Jim Rutenberg, Obama Aims TV Ads at Younger Voters, THE 
CAUCUS (Oct. 8, 2008, 7:22 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/10/ 
08/obama-aims-tv-ads-at-younger-voters/. 
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however, is in addition to the more broad targeting of advertis-
ing in general. In other words, while there is more rifle-shot 
targeting with TV advertising, there is still more shotgun tar-
geting as well. While the trend of micro-targeting and strategic 
shift is not a direct outgrowth of Citizens United, it is clear that 
its impact is consistent with the overall trend stemming from 
the ruling: greater participation and greater fundraising with 
fewer centralized controls means political dollars can reach a 
variety of audiences. This would support the view that far from 
closing out the political process, the post-Citizens United world 
appears to be opening it up.  
V.  SPENDING ADVANTAGES   
Some critics of Citizens United, including President Barack 
Obama, have argued that one of the primary flaws of the ruling 
is the way it permits corporate dollars in the political fundrais-
ing process.87 The argument is that those dollars will over-
whelm the contributions of ordinary citizens and thereby create 
a one-sided political marketplace, with only one side holding 
the megaphone.88 With the assumption that corporations over-
whelmingly favor Republican candidates, the critics say that 
the ruling therefore favors Republicans.89 
But the data do not support this claim. Those outside 
groups that are getting more-involved in political speech are 
not uniform in their ideology, far from it. For example, in 2010, 
after Citizens United, the proportion of issue ad spending by 
the ten highest sponsors accounted for a smaller fraction of to-
tal issue ad spending than in 2002.90 
Interestingly, there has been a relative balance between 
the overall amount in political spending in the midterm elec-
tions, both before and after Citizens United.91 In the top Senate 
 
 87. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 12. 
 88. See, e.g., id. 
 89. See, e.g., Editorial, The Court’s Blow to Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 
22, 2010, at A30 (“Now a . . . conservative majority has distorted the political 
system to ensure that Republican candidates will be at an enormous ad-
vantage in future elections.”). 
 90. See U. WIS. ADVERTISING PROJECT, supra note 3. 
 91. Democratic or Republican ad spending includes candidate and party 
spending as well as groups airing ads on behalf of the candidates of a particu-
lar party. For example, ads aired by American Crossroads would be counted in 
the Republican bucket. For a breakdown of interest group spending by party, see 
2010 Interest Group Spending Tracker, WASH. POST, http://www.washingtonpost 
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races in 2002, the Democrats spent more than Republicans in 
New Jersey and North Carolina. Republicans spent more in 
Tennessee.92 Aside from these exceptions, both parties spent 
about the same amount on television advertising.93 
In the 2006 Senate races, the Democrats spent more on ad-
vertising than the Republicans in the Maryland and Florida 
races.94 Aside from these exceptions, parties spent about the 
same amount in the rest of the races.95  
In the 2010 Senate races, Democrats outspent Republicans 
in Florida, while Republicans outspent Democrats in Connecti-
cut, Wisconsin, and Montana.96 These were the only exceptions.  
Combining both the House and Senate races in 2010, the 
Democrats actually outspent the Republicans.97 However, Re-
publican groups outspent Democratic groups.98 
So while some may argue that Citizens United privileges 
one party over another, our data suggest that more interest 
group advertising promotes a healthy and fair division between 
the parties.  
Consider the 2010 midterm elections. Over the summer of 
2010, House Republicans had a slight advantage over House 
Democrats in advertising spending.99 But as election day ap-
proached, Democratic candidates and the Democratic party 
were spending much more money on political advertising than 
Republicans.100 At the same time, Republican interest groups, 
like Crossroads, Seniors Past 60, and American Action Net-
work, became much more active than their Democratic coun-
terparts in these Congressional races.101 
The combined effect of these expenditures was to give the 
Democrats an overall advantage in spending, but that ad-
vantage was fairly slight.102 The relative parity in spending 
was largely because of the increased activity of outside groups. 
 
.com/wp-srv/politics/campaign/2010/spending/committee_list.html ( last visited 
Apr. 25, 2012). 
 92. See U. WIS. ADVERTISING PROJECT, supra note 3. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. 
 95. See id. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See id. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. 
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While this trend may not hold, the example makes clear that 
dollars from outside groups have actually reduced the money 
gap between the two major parties and have resulted in an 
evening-out in access to political speech. 
VI.  CONTROL OVER MESSAGES   
Critics of Citizens United often say that the ruling will al-
low major political funders to avoid campaign contribution lim-
its by simply giving unlimited sums to outside groups. These 
groups, in turn, will be able to spend liberally to support a giv-
en candidate. 
This analysis runs counter to yet another criticism of Citi-
zens United—that the ruling weakened control of candidates 
over their own election messaging. If outside groups were able 
to echo and reinforce a candidate’s messaging, as the critics 
say,103 they cannot also undermine candidates’ control over 
their messaging. One could be true, but both can’t be. 
As it turns out, candidates and political parties have far 
less control over political speech in the post-Citizens United 
world than they once did. Much to the frustration of campaign 
managers, outside groups generally advertise on issues that 
candidates are not even discussing. 
For example, in the 2002 Senate race, Democratic candi-
dates spent close to $4 million on advertising focused on jobs.104 
Issue groups spent just over $1 million on job issues.105 
In that same race, Republican candidates spent less than 
$1 million on ads focused on taxes.106 Issue groups spent close 
to $5 million on advertising about taxes.107 Clearly, the data 
show that candidates and issue groups can focus on different 
issues, even in the same election. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 103. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 104. See infra Figure 6. 
 105. See id. 
 106. See infra Figure 7. 
 107. See id. 
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Figure 6 
Democratic Spending by Issue Focus and Sponsor, 2002 Elections108 
 
Figure 7 
Republican Spending by Issue Focus and Sponsor, 2002 Elections109 
 
This happens to have clear impacts. While candidates may 
prefer to focus on certain campaign themes and tactics, outside 
groups—prevented by law from cooperating or coordinating 
with specific candidates—may choose other themes and tactics. 
Take the 2004 presidential election. In overall spending, the 
Democrats spent more than the Republicans. The Kerry cam-
paign, plus the Democratic National Committee, plus 
MoveOn.org, and all other Democratic groups combined spent 
more than the Bush campaign plus the Republican National 
Committee, plus the fairly small number of Republican groups 
that were active in that year.110 
Yet because the Bush campaign’s funding was primarily 
concentrated within the official candidate and party’s appa-
ratus, it was able to deliver a more coordinated and strategic 
 
 108. U. WIS. ADVERTISING PROJECT, supra note 3. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See id. 
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suite of political messages, with a special focus on defining Ker-
ry negatively.  
By contrast, the Democratic-leaning outside groups, which 
held more money and power than their Republican counter-
parts, did not follow a coherent approach to their political mes-
sages. Most of these groups were focused on attacking the in-
cumbent, which proved to energize Democratic voters but not 
win over independents. The Kerry campaign alone sought to 
paint a positive picture of their candidate, but those messages 
were overwhelmed by the anti-Kerry and even the anti-Bush 
messages being placed by other major advertisers. The end re-
sult was that the election was defined by the relative populari-
ty of the incumbent President Bush, and not by the appeal of 
the challenger, Kerry. The lack of coordination on the Kerry 
side ended up undermining the funding advantage it enjoyed.  
In this case, the effect—the political victory by the less 
well-funded candidate—would tend to support the view that 
outside groups’ spending can undermine the power of candi-
dates and political parties. Interest groups may promote adver-
tising that does not reflect a campaign’s messaging priorities. 
That is because interest groups exist to reflect the preferences 
of their donors, not the candidates themselves. In the post-
Citizens United environment, an issue or theme has greater po-
tential to be promoted even where a candidate might prefer not 
to raise that issue. This would suggest that meaningful political 
speech is in fact more open and more accessible than it once 
was. While the results may be messy for individual campaigns, 
they do auger well for political speech.  
  CONCLUSIONS   
The Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United was right-
ly seen as a break in campaign finance law and regulation of 
political speech. It attempted to resolve some of the most com-
plex issues related to the regulatory treatment of political 
speech. Perhaps not surprisingly, critics concluded that the rul-
ing would result in several negative outcomes. 
But in the realm of political speech that is most observable 
and most impactful—television advertisements—the changes 
have not been as those critics had feared. While political par-
ties and candidates have indeed lost power over political speech 
due to the rising power of outside funding groups, these groups 
have greatly added to the diversity of political speech. The tim-
ing and substance of their advertisements have differed from 
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the major parties and the candidates, giving the groups a 
chance to champion a candidate or an issue which would oth-
erwise be ignored or overlooked. The reach of the advertising of 
these outside groups has extended well beyond the traditional 
viewership of political ads, drawing in more of the viewing pop-
ulation. And the political loyalties of these outside independent 
groups are far from one-sided, and both major political parties 
can claim to have significantly well-funded outside groups 
pushing in their direction. 
These trends are unmistakable based on a review of the 
patterns of political television advertising from before and since 
Citizens United. While they are subject to change, it is clear 
that the fears of the critics have, at least so far, proven un-
founded. Whether or not one agrees with the legal reasoning of 
Citizens United, the outcome has not been what many quickly 
concluded it would be. This proves, yet again, the value of ana-
lyzing the way political speech actually expresses itself in each 
campaign season. 
